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Abstract— Preserving the privacy of biometric information
stored in biometric systems is becoming a key issue. An
important element in privacy protecting biometric systems is
the quantizer which transforms a normal biometric template
into a binary string. In this paper, we present a user-specific
quantization method based on a likelihood ratio approach (LQ).
The bits generated from every feature are concatenated to form
a fixed length binary string that can be hashed to protect
its privacy. Experiments are carried out on both fingerprint
data (FVC2000) and face data (FRGC). Results show that
our proposed quantization method achieves a reasonably good
performance in terms of FAR/FRR (when FAR is 10−4, the
corresponding FRR are 16.7% and 5.77% for FVC2000 and
FRGC, respectively).
I. INTRODUCTION
Use of biometrics has brought considerable benefits in
the area of access control and ICT security. Recently, how-
ever, protection of biometric template is becoming more
important [1], because a biometric template may reveal
personal information. Additionally, unprotected storage and
transfer of biometric information allows direct steal-and-use
impersonation. Once the biometric template is compromised,
it can not be re-issued.
Biometric template protection aims to protect biomet-
ric reference information stored in biometric systems from
abuse. In the past years, several techniques were developed
to protect biometric information. In [2], [3] the authors
discuss an approach known as ‘cancelable biometrics’. Be-
fore storing the image of a face or a fingerprint in a
biometric system, it is distorted using a parametrized one-
way geometric distortion function. The fuzzy vault method
as introduced in [4] is a general cryptographic construction
allowing to store a secret in a vault that can be locked
using an unordered set of features. An initial attempt to
use the fuzzy vault scheme in the setting of fingerprints
is given in [5]. A third group of techniques, containing
fuzzy commitments [6], fuzzy extractors [7] and helper data
systems [8], derive a key from a biometric measurement
and store an irreversibly hashed version of the key in the
biometric system. It is the purpose of all these methods to
protect the privacy of biometric information without reducing
the performance of the biometric system in terms of False
Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR).
In this paper we will concentrate on the third group of
methods. In order to extract a key, these methods assume
that a biometric template can be represented as a fixed length
binary string. In effect, these methods define the similarity of
two binary templates in terms of Hamming distance [9]. A
binary template is usually obtained by quantizing the original
biometric template using a quantizer. In order to work
properly, many quantizers produce and use side-information
[8], [9], [10] that must be stored in the biometric system.
Since this side-information is user dependent, it may leak
information about the original template. Side-information
with low privacy leakage is therefore a design objective.
So far, few quantization-based template methods have
been proposed. Tuyls et al. [10] first introduced the fixed-
interval quantization (FQ) with one bit per feature, in which
two intervals are separated at the mean of the background
distribution. However, they report an Equal Error Rate (EER)
which is quite high (5.3%) when compared with the EER
of a likelihood ratio classifier (LC) on the same data.
Moreover, the one-bit per feature quantization generates only
short binary strings which may be vulnerable to a brute
force attack. Zhang et al. [11] introduced fixed interval
quantization with multi-bits per feature (ZQ), in which the
quantization intervals are determined by the mean and the
standard deviation of the feature. However, the quantization
method they proposed is not optimal in terms of FAR and
FRR, and the security issue is not addressed by them.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a user-specific, like-
lihood ratio based quantizer (LQ) that allows to extract mul-
tiple bits from a single feature. Experiments are carried out
on both fingerprint data (FVC2000) and face data (FRGC).
Results show that our proposed quantization method achieves
a reasonably good performance in terms of FAR/FRR (when
FAR is 10−4, the corresponding FRR are 16.7% and 5.77%
for FVC2000 and FRGC, respectively). In the mean time,
the stored side-information retains high security.
In section II, our algorithm is presented. In section III,
experiments on synthetic and real data are explained. In
section IV, we discuss the method while conclusions and
directions for further research are given in section V.
II. MULTI-BITS QUANTIZATION
The framework that we describe is similar to the Helper
Data scheme proposed in [10]. It basically includes three
parts: (1) extracting features; (2) quantization and coding
per feature and concatenating the output codes; (3) applying
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Fig. 1. An example of constructing a one-dimensional quantizer based on
the likelihood ratio Lω (dotted). The background pdf is G(v, 0, 1) (solid),
the genuine user pdf is G(v, µω = 0.8, σω = 0.2) (dashed), threshold
t (grey). + illustrates the genuine user interval, whilst ∗ illustrates the
complete quantization intervals and the intervals are labeled with Gray code.
error correction coding (ECC) and hashing. However, in this
paper, we propose a new approach for the first two items.
A. Extracting reliable, distinctive and independent features
One important step before applying quantization is to
extract reliable, distinctive and independent features. In
this paper our models assume Gaussian distributions and
equal within-class variations. Therefore, a sufficient num-
ber of samples is required to provide reliable Gaussian
parameters. Additionally, we require distinctive features,
with small within-class variation and large between-class
variation [12], to reduce quantization errors. Furthermore,
we require features that are independent, with respect to
both the background distributions and the genuine user
distribution. Independent features can reduce the quantization
error and subsequently generate independent bits. To extract
features which meet the above requirements, we choose the
PCA/LDA processing method described in [13].
B. Quantization and concatenation
The user-specific quantization is applied independently
to each feature dimension, and the output codes are con-
catenated as the binary string. The idea of using likelihood
ratio is driven by its optimal FAR/FRR performance in many
biometric applications [14]. In a one-dimensional feature
space V the likelihood ratio of user ω is defined as:
Lω =
G(v, µω, σω)
G(v, µ0, σ0)
, (1)
where v, µ and σ are scalars. Due to the PCA/LDA pro-
cessing, we have G(v, µ0, σ0) with (µ0 = 0;σ0 = 1)
as the background probability density function (pdf) and
G(v, µω, σω) as the genuine user pdf [14].
Fig. 1 shows an example of constructing a one-
dimensional quantizer, given both probability density func-
tions. By applying a threshold t ∈ [0,∞) to the likelihood
ratio Lω , a genuine quantization interval Qgenuine,ω is deter-
mined in the feature space V, in which the genuine user ω
is assigned:
Qgenuine,ω = {v ∈ V | Lω ≥ t} . (2)
With Qgenuine,ω, the probability Pω for an impostor to be
inside the genuine quantization interval can be calculated:
Pω =
∫
Qgenuine,ω
G(v, 0, 1)dv . (3)
We construct the rest of the quantization intervals such that
they have the same probability mass Pω in the background
distribution. This gives an attacker no additional information
on which is the genuine interval. Furthermore, it can be seen
that this might lead to independent bits derived from a single
feature. Thus we have:
Kω⋃
k=1
Qk,ω = V ,
Qk,ω
⋂
Ql,ω = ∅, k = l ,
Qk,ω = Qgenuine,ω, for certain k ,∫
Qk,ω
G(v, 0, 1)dv = Pω , (4)
where Kω is the number of quantization intervals and Qk,ω
is the quantization interval. In the following part, we will see
that Pω presented in (3) equals the FAR for a single feature.
Given an arbitrary t, it is not always possible to let each
quantization interval have this Pω probability. Usually the
left-end and the right-end interval have a probability mass
less than Pω . Therefore, we address them as one wrap-around
interval. In order to meet (4), only thresholds t that can
generate
Pω = 1/Kω , (5)
are applicable in our algorithm. Based on the above proce-
dure, a Kω-interval quantizer is established (∗ in Fig. 1).
Note that Kω might not be an exponential of 2 and it varies
with different users. In most of the applications, we need
to obtain a fixed code length L for all the users. For this
reason, the code length need to be extended from log2 Kω
to L, L = log2 Kω.
Quantization intervals are labeled with a Gray code [15]
which limits the Hamming distance of two adjacent code
words to a single bit (see Fig. 1). This reduces the number
of bit errors due to within-class variation.
Besides the binary code generated above, the quantizer
information (known as side-information Qω) has to be stored
for user ω as well. Since the background pdf is known,
we only have to randomly select one quantization interval
(Qk,ω | k ∈ [1,Kω]) as the side-information to be stored.
To extend the quantization to the m-dimensional case,
we simply need to apply the above method to each feature
dimension. The output binary string Sω is a concatenation
of binary codes corresponding to the genuine intervals of
each dimension, and the side-information is the collection of
quantizer information for each dimension.
C. FAR/FRR and security
Given a threshold t, the false acceptance rate FARi,ω(t)
and false rejection rate FRRi,ω(t) of user ω with the one-
dimensional feature i is given by:
FARi,ω(ti) =
∫
Qgenuine,ω
G(v, 0, 1)dv , (6)
FRRi,ω(ti) = 1−
∫
Qgenuine,ω
G(v, µω, σω)dv . (7)
Assuming that the PCA/LDA process results in inde-
pendent features, the FAR and FRR in the m-dimensional
feature space Vm for user ω, with the threshold vector
T = [t1 . . . tm], is defined as:
FARω(T) =
m∏
i=1
FARi,ω(ti) , (8)
FRRω(T) = 1−
m∏
i=1
(1− FRRi,ω(ti)) . (9)
In a conventional biometric system, FAR represents the
security at the real-valued biometric representation level. In
our system, since we derive a binary string as the output
representation, it is necessary to consider the security at
the binary string level as well. Thus ideally the entropy of
the output string H(Sω) should be high, and the mutual
information I(Sω;Qω) between the output binary string and
the published side-information should be zero [10].
For one-dimensional feature i, given the number of quan-
tization intervals Ki,ω , the way to achieve a high binary
string entropy and a mutual information zero is to build
the quantization according to (4), which means an equal
probability Pω for each quantization interval. This requires
a threshold t that gives FARi,ω = 1/Ki,ω . Under this
condition, the binary string entropy Hi(Si,ω) and its relation
with FARi,ω is given by (10). In our implementation, the
wrap-around interval, with less than Pω probability mass for
each of the left-end and right-end interval, will never be a
genuine interval. Due to this effect, the mutual information
is (11).
Hi(Si,ω) = log2 Ki,ω = − log2 FARi,ω , (10)
Ii(Si,ω;Qi,ω) = log2 Ki,ω − log2 (Ki,ω − 1) . (11)
In the m-dimensional feature space Vm, the m features are
independent because of the PCA/LDA process. Hence, the
binary string entropy and the mutual information becomes:
H =
m∑
i=1
Hi , (12)
I =
m∑
i=1
Ii . (13)
D. Optimization
A good biometric system requires low FARω/FRRω with
high H . A well-defined method is to construct a receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve based on all possible
m-dimensional FARω and FRRω [11]. Every point on the
ROC curve corresponds to a threshold vector T. An optimal
system can be found by minimizing the overall FRRω given
the FARω constraint:
argmin
T
(FRRω(T)), given FARω(T) = α . (14)
The above optimization procedure needs a full range of T
vectors, while in our case, only some T vectors are accept-
able according to requirement (5). To solve this problem, we
proposed a sub-optimal method. We will explain the detail
of this method in section III-B.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To examine the performance of this likelihood ratio based
quantization method, we conducted experiments on both
synthetic and real data sets.
A. Synthetic data experiments
We first carried out an experiment on the synthetic Gaus-
sian data, with six methods: (1) likelihood ratio classifier
(LC); (2) Zhang’s multi-bits quantization (ZQ) [11]. In this
method, each feature component is quantized with multiple
intervals and each interval has the same fixed size (kσ),
where σ denotes the standard deviation of the genuine
user pdf; (3) fixed one-bit quantization (FQ1) [10]. In this
method, each feature component is quantized with 2 fixed
intervals which have equally 0.5 background probability
mass; (4) fixed two-bits quantization (FQ2). In this method,
each feature component is quantized with 4 fixed intervals
which have equally 0.25 background probability mass; (5)
fixed three-bits quantization (FQ3). In this method, each
feature component is quantized with 8 fixed intervals which
have equally 0.125 background probability mass; (6) our
likelihood ratio based multi-bits quantization (LQ).
We first performed a one-dimensional simulation on both a
distinctive (σ = 0.2) and a non-distinctive (σ = 0.8) feature
example. Fig. 2 shows the ROC performance of the overall
user population. Our LQ method has the best FAR/FRR
performance, the same as a likelihood ratio classifier. For
fixed quantization FQ1, FQ2 and FQ3, it is not possible to
tune any parameter, and their performance is worse than our
LQ method. When the user within-class variation is small
(e.g. σ = 0.2) , LQ has similar performance as ZQ, when
the user within-class variation is large (e.g. σ = 0.8), LQ
outperforms ZQ.
We applied the LQ method on two-dimensional synthetic
data, based on the assumption that the user within-class
variance for the first two dimensions was σ1 = 0.2 and σ2 =
0.8 respectively. The optimal ROC curve was constructed
by the process described in section II-D. Fig. 3 plots the
two-dimensional overall ROC performance, and it suggests
that the combined ROC curve constructed from our LQ
method does not introduce a large degradation compared to
the performance of LC.
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Fig. 2. One-dimensional simulation result: (a) Overall ROC with σ = 0.2;
(b) Overall ROC with σ = 0.8. ZQ (dashed); LQ and LC (solid); FQ1 (∗);
FQ2 (); FQ3 (+).
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Fig. 3. Two-dimensional simulation result: ROC of the one-dimensional
feature σ1 = 0.2 (dotted); ROC of the one-dimensional feature σ2 = 0.8
(dashed); ROC of the two-dimensional features σ1 = 0.2 and σ2 = 0.8
from LQ (solid); ROC of the same two-dimensional features from LC (dash-
dotted).
B. Real data experiments
The real data experiments were conducted on two data
sets: a fingerprint data set FVC2000 (DB2) [16], [17] and
a face data set FRGC (version 1) [18]. Both data sets were
extracted into fixed length feature vectors.
• FVC2000(DB2): This fingerprint data set contains
8 images of 110 different users. The original feature
vector length extracted from the image was 1536 [10].
Features include the squared directional field and the
Gabor response.
• FRGC(ver1): This face data set contains variable
images of 275 different users. The images were taken
under controlled conditions and they were aligned using
manually labeled landmarks. The original feature vector
length extracted from the image was 8762. Features are
the grey value of the face images.
The experiments consist of three steps: training, enroll-
ment and verification. During the initial off-line training step,
PCA/LDA was applied on the training data to reduce the
feature dimension. Afterwards, an enrollment step was con-
ducted in which the quantizers were constructed based on the
enrollment data, in particular the means of the features after
dimensionality reduction. The output reference binary string
and the side-information were stored. In the verification step,
verification data were quantized based on the quantizer side-
information, and the output query string was compared to
the reference string for the final decision. To split the data,
75% (FVC2000) and 50% (FRGC) of the samples per user
were used for both training and enrollment, and the rest 25%
(FVC2000) and 50% (FRGC) of the samples were used for
verification. For both data sets, we extracted 50 features from
their original measurements. To compare the query and the
reference binary strings, we applied a Hamming distance
classifier, in which the Hamming distance represents the
number of different bits between the enrollment and verifica-
tion binary string. The Hamming distance classifier replaces
the ECC present in many template protection methods (e.g.
[10]). Assigning a threshold D to the distance has the same
effect as applying an ECC that can correct at most D bits.
By varying the threshold D, a ROC curve on the verification
data can be constructed. To obtain a reasonable error on the
results, we repeated the above procedure with 20 random
splits of enrollment and verification data.
We conducted two types of experiments. In the first
experiment, we examined the feature extraction performance
via the PCA/LDA process, followed by the FQ1 quantization.
The result was compared to the reliable bits selection method
proposed in [10], in which the output binary strings are
selected directly from the original feature measurements,
with a pre-selection based on the reliability of FQ1 re-
sults on each enrollment sample and a selection based on
the ratio of within-class variation and between-class vari-
ation. Fig. 4 plots the log-ROC curves derived from both
PCA/LDA method and reliable bits selection method. For
both FVC2000 and FRGC, the performance increases dra-
matically with PCA/LDA. Such result suggests that features
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Fig. 4. Results of PCA/LDA feature extraction compared to the reliable bits
selection method on FVC2000 (black) and FRGC (grey) (feature dimension
for PCA is 100 and feature dimension for LDA is 50). Reliable bits selection
method (dashed); PCA/LDA/FQ1 method (solid).
extracted from PCA/LDA method are more reliable and
distinctive, which provides a crucial precondition for the
upcoming quantization step.
In the second experiment, we examined the different quan-
tization performances. To do a high-dimensional quantization
experiment, we need to construct a ROC curve for high-
dimensional features, but the optimization method described
by (14) in section II-D is not feasible and constructing an
optimal ROC curve is a point of further research. However,
since a fixed length binary string as output is often preferred,
we propose an alternative sub-optimal LQn method. The core
idea is to quantize each feature dimension into n bits, which
also means that the FAR per dimension is fixed to 2−n. As
a result, the output string will have a fixed length.
We performed the experiments of LQ2 (n = 2) and LQ3
(n = 3) on both data sets, followed by the three-step pro-
cedure described above. The feature dimension after feature
extraction was set to 50. Consequently, each user ended up
with 100 and 150 bit string. (Note that the above likelihood
ratio based quantization is user customized, which means
each user has his own optimized quantization configuration.)
Afterwards, we compared the LQ2 and LQ3 performance
with FQ1, FQ2, FQ3 and LC methods.
Fig. 5 and 6 show the ROC plots for FVC2000 and
FRGC data sets. It can be seen that results from all the
methods are consistent on both data sets. LC is superior
to all the quantization based methods. Apparently, FQ1,
FQ3 and LQ3 do not provide comparable performance to
LQ2 and FQ2. Compared to LQ2, FQ2 has a slightly worse
performance. That means LQ2 consistently outperforms all
the quantization methods, and its performance is not signifi-
cantly degraded compared to the LC result. Table I lists the
performance of LQ2 under different FAR/FRR requirements,
compared to the LC performance. For a reasonable appli-
cation requiring FAR = 10−4, the corresponding FRR are
16.7% (FVC2000) and 5.77% (FRGC) respectively, which
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Fig. 5. Log-ROC curve of the fingerprint FVC2000 data.
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Fig. 6. Log-ROC curve of the face FRGC data.
is acceptable as compared to the performance of the LC
classifier. The Hamming distance threshold needed to achieve
such system performance is 29 from 100 bits for both data
sets.
Now we analyze the security of the output binary string.
Under the assumption of independent features, the output
average string entropy for FQ2, LQ2, FQ3 and LQ3 are 100,
100, 150 and 150 respectively. However, in practice these
numbers will be lower due to dependency of the individual
features. The mutual information I between the output binary
string and the side-information is zero for the FQ method,
TABLE I
THE PERFORMANCE OF LC, LQ2 UNDER DIFFERENT SYSTEM
REQUIREMENTS
FAR = 10−2 FAR = 10−3 FAR = 10−4
FRR D FRR D FRR D
FVC2000-LC 3.8% N/A 8.7% N/A 16.2% N/A
FVC2000-LQ2 4.3% 37 8.7% 33 16.7% 29
FRGC-LC 0.41% N/A 1.20% N/A 2.80% N/A
FRGC-LQ2 1.03% 37 2.60% 33 5.77% 29
but not zero for our LQ method. For instance, the mutual
information for LQ2 is 0.415 bit per feature component. This
can be viewed as a sacrifice of security since we introduced
more user-specific information in the LQ quantization.
IV. DISCUSSION
The performance of the quantization methods is affected
by two factors: the quality of the features and the quantiza-
tion interval size. In our case, the quality of the features
is defined as the within-class variation of each feature
component after the PCA/LDA process, and the quantization
interval size is driven by the number of quantization bits per
feature dimension: quantization into 1 bit per feature (FQ1);
quantization into 2 bits per feature (FQ2/LQ2) and quanti-
zation into 3 bits per feature (FQ3/LQ3). An investigation
on the within-class variation of the feature components after
PCA/LDA process demonstrates that for both FVC2000 and
FRGC data sets, the within-class variance of the 50 features
range from 0.142 to 0.602. If FQ1 is applied, which has
relatively large quantization intervals compared to the feature
variation, the FRR per feature dimension is low. However,
in this case the FAR of 0.5 per dimension is quite high. This
results also in a high FAR in the high dimensional experiment
(8). If FQ3 and LQ3 are applied, which have relatively small
quantization intervals compared to feature variation, the FAR
reduces to 0.125 per feature dimension. In contrast, the FRR
per feature dimension will be high. This results in a high FRR
in the high dimensional experiment (9). Therefore, FQ2 and
LQ2 turn out to be a good compromise with respect to the
FAR/FRR requirements. This explains why in Fig. 5 and Fig.
6, LQ2 and FQ2 outperforms FQ1, FQ3 and LQ3.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we discussed the problem of transforming
biometric feature vectors into binary strings which are to be
used in recently introduced methods for privacy protection
of biometric information. We proposed to pre-process the
feature vectors using a PCA/LDA transformation followed by
a quantizer based on a likelihood ratio approach. Depending
on the setting, our quantizer allows to extract multiple bits
from a single feature. Comparison of our approach with
a number of quantizers known from the literature, using
both synthetic and real-life data, shows that the likelihood
quantizer outperforms the other quantizers. Moreover, its
performance is not significantly degraded as compared to
a traditional likelihood classifier.
In our current experiments we extracted the same num-
ber of bits for every feature. In practice, however, not
all features are equally distinctive. Therefore, an adaptive
coding method, in which more bits are assigned to distinctive
features and less bits to non-distinctive features, is a point
of future research.
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